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Erasmus, Luther, and Aquinas
PHILIP WATSON

ne of the most recent additions the
0on Luther
growing Roman Catholic literature
is a study of his doctrine of the
to

bondage of the will in the light-as the
subtitle of the German edition says- of
the Biblical and ecclesiastical tradition.1
Its author, Harry J. McSorley, endorses
Luther's own view of the outstanding importance of his D11 servo arb#rio as dealing
with the most central issue of his reforming work. He also endorses Luther's claim
that his primary concern was a reformation, not simply of practical abuses but
of doctrine, and he fully agrees that no
rightly
area of doctrine in Luther's time
was more
in need of reform than that of grace and
free will. What is more, he argues that
Luther's view on this subject is in intention, if not always in his way of expressing
it, entirely in harmony with authentic
Catholic teaching, of which in his time
there was a widespread and disastrous ignorance.

In the light of this it may not b_e inappropriate in celebrating the 500th anniversary of the birth of Luther's distinguished opponent on this subject, Erasmus
1 Harry J. McSorley, l.lllbffS um ""' nfr,in WiJlffl t1t1cb ,,;,,.,.
Sffflo
Haf'lscbn/1 D•

.,bilno ;,,.

of Rotterdam, to take a fresh look at the
contraversy between these two men, with
some assistance from Aquinas as a representative of authentic Catholic ttacbing.2
To begin with, we may reaJ1 Luther's
Statement in his NSfflio ommtm 11rliet1lo11,m, published late in 1520, that
I was wroDB in sayiDB that free choice before grace is a reality only in name. I
should have said "free choice is in reality a
fiction, or a name without reality." For no
one has it in his own power to think a
good or bad thought, but everythiDB (a
Wycliff's article condemned at ComtaDCe
teaches) happens by absolute necessity.

It is with this statement that Erasmus essentially takes issue in his D, libffo or!.
lrio, written early in 1524 when he was at
last persuaded to dissociate himself from
Luther. Unfortunately, as McSorley points
out, his argument concentrates on the last
part of the statement ( concerning "necessity"), and never really comes to grips
with Luther's essential concern. The nature
of that concem Luther explains in replying
to Erasmus in the D, sffllo •bilrio. It is
the question "whether the will does anything or nothing in maners pertaining to

Li,b,- ,J.,. biblisch• ntl jJ,d,.

2 Much of what follows ii drawn fiom mJ
Theolosical
to Lll,b., •
B,11111UU:
Will 11tul S.JHlion (Vol. XVII of the l.Jmniul Th.alogiul s,lul, of Lldbws Mtljor 1,,.,, of C/mslitl,, C'4ldes, shortly to be pubWo,k, Th• Bon"'6g• of lb. Will (MiDDe&polis: lished by the Westmimler Pms. Philadelphia,
Augsburg, 1969).
in which Brumm' O• IN Pr.Jo• of IN Will
and Luther's 0• IN BOffUI• of lh• Will ue
Th• ••lhor is 1h11 R11U P,of•ssor of S1m- translated and edited respecdvelf by B. G. B.upp
t11111ie Th•olog'J d G""dl Th•ologiul Sffli,. in collaboradon with N. Marlowe and P. S.
Waaoa in collabomicm with B. Dmreq).
flM'J i,, BfllltlSIOII, llL
747

lkbm T,ltdilior, (Munich: Huber,Intioduaion
1967); English uans., L#lh•r: RighiBa,.
or Wrongl A•
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eternal salvation"; and Erasmus ought to

be aware
that this is the cardinal issue between us,
the point on which everything in this controversy turns. For what we are doing is to
inquire what free choice can do, what it
has done to it, and what is its relation to
the grace of God.
On this subject, however, Erasmus is very
far from dear, as we shall see.
For Erasmus the essential thing is that
man should have freedom of choice. Without it there would be no sense in meting
out praise or blame, since there could be
no possibility of man's meriting either.
Nor would there be any sense in God's
law and Cflrnmandments; for their imperative "Thou shalt" implies the indicative
'"Thou canst," and to deny the latter is to
stultify the former. In practice, moreover,
to teach men that they have no real choice
can only foster irresponsibility and encourage antinOJJ1ianism. But that is not
the worst of it. If man acts solely from
necessity, having no freedom, he cannot
possibly deserve either reward or punishment; hence if God rewards and punishes
He is manifestly unjust. Erasmus' concern
for human freedom is thus also a concern
for the character of God. Not that he is
unmindful of God's grace, which transcends any strict legality, and without
which man cannot poss1'bly be saved. Yet
men must have freedom to choose or refuse grace, so that if they are damned for
the Jack of it their damnation will at least
have been justly deserved. At this Luther
wryly observes that people seem more
easily upset by the injustice of God's wrath
in damning the undeserving than by the
injustice of his grace in saving the unde-

serving!
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Luther himself, of course, maintains that
neither salvation nor damnation has anything to do with merit. In relation to God
the thought of merit has no place, and to
teach that it bas can only lead to legalism
and a vain striving for salvation by works.
There is a reward for the righteous and
punishment for the wicked, but to seek
the righteousness in order to merit the
reward is the surest way to find neither.
But that is not all. God, Luther insists, is
not moved by the merits or demerits of
men; He is not determined in what He
does by what men do. This is essential to
the freedom of God-whatever it does
to His justice. And Luther is concerned
for God's freedom, because to deny it is
to undermine the Gospel and grace, indeed, it is to deny God Himself. For God's
freedom is precisely the freedom of grace,
that is, of the divine love revealed at its
deepest in Christ, which startlingly ignores
the calculated schemes of merit and reward which prevail among men. Not that
this in the least makes God's law and commandments meaningless; on the conaary,
it discloses their true meaning, which ultimately is a demand for just such love as
i~ seen in Christ. So far, therefore, from
showing man what he ought to do and
can do, they show him what he ought but
does not and cannot do unless he is radically transformed by grace.
Now in order to explain these conaary
assertions of Erasmus and Luther, it is necessary to notice a certain difference in their
approaches to the problem. I mean the
fact that Erasmus thinks essentially along
traditional Scholastic lines, while Luther
does not. In particular, Erasmus presupposes the metaphysical dualism of "nature"
and "supemature" on which all Scholastic
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thinking basically rests, and in terms of
which the relation between man and God,
human nature and divine grace, is construed. Luther, on the other hand, takes
much more seriously a quite different dualism, namely that of God and the devil.
The significance of this can best be illustrated by contrasting his view of the basic
human situation with that of the Schoolmen.
According to the latter, man before the
Fall was endowed with certain natural
powers ( especially reason and free will),
together with a superm1tural gift of grace.
This gift was necessary if man was to atmin his true end, namely eternal life and
blessedness, which was beyond the powers
of mere nature. But since by these powers
( aided by grace) man was able to know
and to do the good, he could by doing it
merit glory. He was, however, under no
compulsion, but had freedom of choice
between good and evil; be could obey or
disobey God. At the Fall he chose to disobey, and in consequence lost his supernatural gift and was left in a state of mere
nature.
What effect the Fall had on man's natural powers was a matter of debate, but most
of the Schoolmen agreed that they were at
least weakened, and some that they were
considerably impaired - a view which
Erasmus shares. Yet nature remains nature
even in fallen man, and the light that is
in him is not darkness, no matter how low
it burns. His reason and will may be
"wounded," even "corrupted," but they are
not extinguished. His passions, the lower
ingredients of his nature, may be deeply
disordered, so that he is a constant prey
to carnality, but he is not wholly carnal
His nature remains compounded as it al-
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ways was of animal "Besh" and that mtional "spirit" which is the distinguishing
mark of humanity, with the "soul" in between and capable of leaning towards
either.
Erasmus cannot agree with Luther's contention that fallen man is nothing but
"Besh." He thinks Luther grossly exaggerates the natural man's sinfulness, doing
injustice to nature in his desire to cnlt
grace. He himself would rather say that
there is something good about nature even
in an aa of adultery, because there is
something real about it. (Here Erasmus
echoes the .Augustinian-Thomistic equation of "being" and "goodness," an equation which Luther does not make.) But
Erasmus fails co notice that when Luther
speaks of fallen human nature as "Besh,"
he is using the word in a more comprehensive and more Pauline sense, which has to
do far less with anirnaliry than with egocentticity.
For Erasmus therefore (as for the
Schoolmen) fallen man still possesses some
"goodness" and some capacity for the
knowledge of and obedience to God. But
there is certainly a question as to what
this capacity is worth as regards the attaining of salvation. Can man do anything
roward his salvation without the help of
grace? If he can, how much can he do?
If he cannot, what measure of grace is
needed to enable him? On these questions
there were widely divergent views, especially in late Scholasticism, and Ensmus
reBeas the prevailing uncertainty of his
time. He himself inclines to the "probable
opinion" (as he calls it) that man can take
no sreps wharsoever tonrd salvation. without "peculiar" grace; yet he does not .reject
the opposing view as W\lCOlble. Indeed

3
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he vacillates between them, and, as McSorley says, is evidently quite unaware that
his "probable opinion" is the authentic
teaching of the Catholic Church.
What Erasmus does reject is the idea
that man has no active part to play in seauing his own salvation. For at least man
has freedom of choice. That is to say, he
has in his will the power "to apply himself to those things which pertain to eternal salvation, or to turn away from them."
It is true that, as Luther observes, Erasmus
never quite specifies what "those things"
are; but his general argument suggests that
he has in mind obedience to God's commandments.
It is also uue that in the course of the
argument man's power to apply himself
becomes subject co considerable qualification. Nevertheless, Erasmus continues to
maintain that however little man can do,
yet if he "does what in him lies" God will
assist him with His grace, for "divine grace
always accompanies human effort." Indeed,
according to the "probable opinion" the
very possibility cif such effort depends on
prevenient grace, without which the will
of fallen man is "compelled to serve sin."
But it is up to man to respond to the
divine initiative. Nature must cooperate
with grace, the human will with the divine,
and this is a matter for man's own choice,
so that he is himself responsible for his
own eventual salvation or perdition. Salvation is a cooperative enterprise (S'Jflff•
gismos) of God and man, to which both
partners make their contribution, even
though man's share in it is so small that
it is an excusable and even praiseworthy
enggeration when everything is attributed
a,

God.

Turning now to Luther's view, we find

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/72

a situation that is both more complex and
more dramatic. Before the Fall, as Luther
sees it, man's relation to God was characterized by his total dependence on God,
whose grace or unmerited love evoked in
him the response of faith, that is, trust and
obedience. This relationship was and is
the truly natural relationship of man as
creature co God as his Creator. In this situation man's reason was enlightened and
his will directed by the Spirit of God, so
that he knew God as his heavenly Father
and obeyed His commandments with unquestioning .filial devotion. He had, and
could have, no desire but to obey. He necessariby did the will of God, for he had no
"will of his own" independent of God's.
Yet he acted 11olun1anl1 and was in no
way coerced, for as inwardly moved by the
Spirit he naturally wanted what God
wanted. And since the Spirit of God is
the Spirit of love, he also acted freel1, that
is, with the spontaneity of divine love.
Then came the Fall Man fell into the
clutches of Satan, who impelled him to
make a declaration of independence over
against God, persuading him that this
meant freedom. How it was possible for
the evil spirit to supplant the Holy Spirit
in man, Luther does not explain, though
he is quite clear that it was not because
man had "free choice" between God and
Satan. He therefore simply takes man's
fallenness as fact, and understands it to
mean that man is no longer moved by the
Holy Spirit but by an entirely opposite
spirit. Man has turned from faith in God
to unbelief ( distrust and disobedience),
exchanging his right and natural relation
to God for a thoroughly wrong and unnatural one. In Pauline terms, having begun
in the Spirit he has ended in the "flesh,"
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he is no longer spiritual but carnal; and
this applies to the whole man, not just
some part of him, so that it can be said
that everything about him- body, soul,
and spirit - is "Jlesh."
Of course, fallen man remains man; he
is not a mere animal, and still less a devil.
He retains his powers of reason and will,
and he still has some knowledge of God
and His law. But both his reasoning and
his willing are radically corrupt, being
governed from the start by the false premises dictated by Saran. Satan is the antithesis of God, who is love, selBess and self.
giving. Satan is the very spirit of egoism
and self-love; and it is by this spirit that
fallen man is moved and governed. In consequence, whatever man knows of God and
His will is caricatured and falsified, seen
as it were through a distorting mirror.
When the will of God runs counter to his
own, it seems to him arbitrary and tyrannical, and if he does not simply B.out it in
blind self-assertion, he complies with it in
calculating self-interest, with an eye to
escaping punishment or gaining reward.
He acts thus of necessiJ1, inasmuch as he
has no "will of his own" over against the
evil spirit by which he is inwardly moved;
and just for that reason he also aas 11olun1a,il,y, not under any coercion against his
will. But he does nol aa fr,ely, that is,
with the spontaneity of genuine love; nor
~ he do so unless and until he is set free
by divine grace.
Freedom, in the full and proper sense
of the term, belongs in Luther's view only
to God. God is free as being subject to no
other power whatsoever, and as acting
therefore solely according to His own will
God's will, however, is in no way capricious or arbitrary, but consistently ri&ht•
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eous and good. For what God wills is consonant with His naaue, which in Christand even in aeation, for those who have
eyes to see- is revealed as love. This it is
that shows what real freedom means. It is
the spontaneity of a love that is neither
evoked by nor proportioned to the qualities of its objects-quite unlike fallen
man's loving, which is ordinarily both
evoked and measured by what its objects
are thought to deserve. God therefore acts
with absolute freedom; He does not simply
react, as men in their bondage to Satan do.
Luther admits, of course, that man has
a son of freedom in respect of what he
calls "things beneath him." That .is, he has
the ability to choose as he wishes between
different possibilities presented to him
amid the circumstances of his temporal
life. He can even choose to behave or
not behave in accordance with the precepts
of God's Jaw. He can "do the works of the
Law" - and he ought to do them, for they
are "good works." But "good works do
not make a good man," for good works can
be done from a bad motive; and the motivation of fallen man is thoroughly bad.
Hence the good works even of God's Jaw
cannot contribute one iota toward his eternal salvation, for he sins in the very doing
of them; and there is nothing h~ birnrH
can do to alter this. If he is to be saved,
the evil spirit that drives him must be
driven out by the Holy Spirit of pee.
Until this happens, he may "do the works
of the Law," but be can never "fulfil the
Law," for the fulfilling of the Law is love.
In this regard he is Dot free, though he
can be set free; hence what he calls his
"free will" would more properly be called
"self-will," which means bondage to Satan.
There .is, however, one respect in which

5
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neither fallen nor unfallen man ever had
or can have freedom; that is, in relation
to "things above him," as Luther calls
them, which pertain to eternal salvation
or perdition. This means - to put it in its
simplest terms - that whatever else man
might be free to choose, he can never in
the nature of the case choose the motivation of his choice. All choices are determined by some ultimate principle, and in
the .final analysis there are only two possibilities: man is governed either by the
Spirit of God or by the evil spirit. There
is no neutral ground on which he can stand
between these while he makes up his mind
to which he will submit. Man is not capable of freedom in this sense; he has no
liberty of indifference. Hence, although
his eternal destiny depends on whether he
is ruled by Satan or God, yet between these
he is not free to choose. He is always governed by one or the other- or buffeted
between the two like a beast over which
two would-be riders contend.
Luther's famous- or infamous! - simile of the beast and its riders was not of
course his own invention. There was a
long tradition of its use. Only, as McSorley
points out, Luther breaks with the tradition in that he equates the beast simply
with the will (not free will), makes the
riders God and Satan instead of sin and
grace, and gives the beast no option as to
which rider it shall have. This undoubtedly raises difficulties, but in mitigation of
them the following three points should be
borne in mind: First, neither God nor
Satan is conceived by Luther as acting exteriorly and coercively on man's will, but
is thought of as a spiritual power operating
from within, so that all man's action is
quite voluntary and uncoerced. Second,

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/72

God and Satan as contenders for the control of man are far from contending on
equal terms, as if man stood in the same
relation to both. For God is the Creator,
on whom both man and Satan are ultimately dependent. Third, God as the Creator is in Luther's thought the incessantly
active source of all activity, and all of His
activity is absolutely righteous and good.
And yet the results of His activity are not
invariably good. •F or when "by the general
motion of his omnipotence" He activates
the wills of sinful men and devils ( including Satan himself), these act in accordance
with their character, which is bad. Even
God's omnipotence can only move evil
wills to evil acts. But the evil of man's or
Satan's will is not to be ascribed to God
as its cause. Here Luther is entirely in accord with the traditional Scholastic teaching that God is the cause of sinful aets but
not of their sinfulness. Yet he cannot
agree with the Schoolmen in attributing
this to man's free will or freedom of choice,
for it is plain evidence that man is not free
but in bondage to Satan.
It is, however, God's purpose to save
man from this evil bondage, and to that
end He works by means of His Word and
His Spirit. That is how He contends with
Satan for the control of man. By His
Word He confronts men outwardly and
by His Spirit inwardly, first in the form
of Law, then of Gospel. I need not here
elaborate on this aspect of Luther's
thought, but will simply make two observations on it. First, it is the function of
the Law, in what he calls its spiritual use,
to bring home to men their sinful plight
and their inability to save themselves from
perdition. In this way men are made ready
for the Gospel and its message of grace.

6
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Although, therefore, Luther repudiates the
Scholastic idea that man can prepare himself for grace by "doing what in him lies,"
he does not deny that there is a preparation
for grace; he affirms it, only as God's doing, not man's. Second, it is the function
of the Gospel, in what Luther calls its
proper office, to bring home to man the
grace and love of God and evoke in him
the response of faith. Where and insofar
as this happens, man is restored to his true
and natural .relationship to God and
thereby enters into the fullest freedom of
which he is capable. This is the liberty of
the children of God, in which men can
freely cooperate with God, not for the
achieving of their own salvation but in the
fuUilling of God's purposes in the world
with respect both to ics spiritual and temporal welfare.
For Luther, man's cooperation with God
is not a precondition of salvation, as it is
for Erasmus; it is rather a consequence of
salvation. And salvation itself is differently understood. For Erasmus, salvation
calls for a supernaturalizing of human narure by divine grace ( which is generously
given in response even co the feeblest of
man's efforcs) in order that man may become acceptable to God and a .rightful
claimant to the eternal life and blessedness
of heaven. For Luther, it means the liberation of man by the gracious action of God
from an unnatural bondage, so that he lives
a truly natural life in trustful obedience to
God and can look forward to the heavenly
reward, not as in any sense his right but
as the sure and certain promise of God's
gracious Word.
Unfortunately, however, the effect of
God's Word is not always salvific. It can
in fact "increase sin," making bad men
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worse by hardening them in their resistance to God. As spoken to Pharaoh
through Moses, for example, it simply
stiffened his self-will and provoked him
to open defiance. le can also harden men
in self-righteousness, as it hardened the
Pharisees when they encountered it in
Christ. Why should this be so? In wrestling with this question Luther is led to
propound his distinction between the ''hidden" and the "revealed" will of God and
his doctrine of double predestination. Into
this subject I cannot enter here beyond
making the following comment. With this
docuine Luther is expressing on the one
hand a very proper piece of Christian agnosticism, and on the other the very essence
of Christian faith. He is saying in effect
that while we do not and cannot know all
the answers, we do know where the answers lie, namely with God, and we are
utterly sure that God's answers are good.
le is true that Luther does not always express himself as guardedly as he might in
these matters, and he sometimes seezm to
know more than he should. But at lease
he is more modest than Erasmus, who has
the answers pat. For Erasmus it is euy
to explain the diverse effecrs of God's
Word on men by referring them to human
freedom of choice, and the problem of
divine predestination is easily solved by
reference to God's foreknowledge of men's
merits.
Erasmus knows, of course, that his position is open to the objection ( which Luther does not fail to bring) that divine
foreknowledge imposes necessity on men,
leaving no room for contingency or free
choice. He cries to forestall this objection
by refeuing to the Scholastic distinction
between two kinds of necessity, absolute

7
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and conditional, which be illustrates as
follows: Although God undoubtedly foreknew that Judas would betray Christ, yet
Judas was not forced ( by absolute necessity) ro do this, for he could have changed
his mind; hence bis action was only conditionally necessary, being conditional on
his not changing his mind; though admittedly if he had been going to change his
mind, God would have foreknown that as
well. To which Luther makes the obvious
reply that in that case the change of mind
must also have been necessary - absolutely, and not just contingently or conditionally necessary. Luther dismisses the
Scholastic distinction as a mere play on
words and proposes an alternative of bis
own. He is not speaking, he says, of the
necessity of coercion or force, but of immutability. Certainly Judas was not forced
ro betray Christ, he did it voluntarily; but
his will being what it was he could not do
otherwise, for the will cannot change itself; hence he aaed as he did of necessity
- the necessity of immutability; he certainly did not aa freely, for he was under
the control of Satan.
It is a pity that Erasmus was not familiar
with Aquinas, who could have shown him
that things are really not so simple, and
might have provided him with a harder
nut for Luther to aack. For St. Thomas it
is as dear that man has free will and freedom of choice as that God's foreknowledge
is immutable and His will infallible. It
is indeed so clear that instead of raising
the question whether God's foreknowledge
imposes necessity on us, he asks rather
whether the contingency of man's freedom
w choose imposes limits on the foreknowledge of God. His answer is that it does
nor, and his argument is more or less as

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/72

follows: The will of God is the universal
cause of all things, and whatever God wills
necessarily comes to pass. But God is
under no necessity to will anything but
His own being and beatitude, so that all
other necessity is conditional on His willing it. If God wills a thing, that thing
necessarily happens. It also happens in
the way He wills it to happen, which may
be by absolute or by conditional necessity,
or - as it can also be put- necessarily or
contingently. We might perhaps illustrate
this in the following way: Alan's existence
is a matter of conditional necessity, since
God is under no necessity to will it; man's
nature as an animate being possessed
among other things of free will is a matter
of absolute necessity, since that is how
God wills it; and man's condua as contingent on his freedom of choice is a matter of conditional necessity, since that also
is how God wills it.
But the thought of man's freedom of
choice gives rise to the question whether
God can really have foreknowledge of
man's actions. To this question St. Thomas'
reply in very brief is this: If you consider
an aaion as future, not yet having happened because a choice has not yet been
made, then it is contingent and unknowable; but consider it as having been performed, the choice having been decisively
made, and it is necessary and can plainly be
known. Now for us it is impossible t0
adopt these two points of view simultaneously with regard to the same action; but
not so for God. God sees the end from the
beginning, and the whole range of events
throughout the rotality of time is simultaneously present to Him. Hence human
freedom and the immutable foreknowledge
of God are by no means incompatible. And

8
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this does not mean that contingency or
freedom is only a matter of the way things
appear to us (as Luther, incidentally, suggests) but it is a reality also for God.
It is interesting, however, to notice that
St. Thomas distinguishes, as Erasmus does
not, between different sores of freedom·,
and two of these are not altogether unlike
Luther's distinaion between man's freedom
with respect ro "things beneath him" and
the freedom of a Christian man. There is,
first, natural freedom, in which man's will
has the ability to choose without any compulsion between objects as means ro ends.
It is not an unlimited freedom, inasmuch
as man is not free to choose his ultimate
end, which is beatitude. This he necessarily wills as his summNm bonum, though
he can freely choose between inferior ends.
Yet he is under no necessity to think about
and set his mind on his ultimate end, or to
choose appropriate means for attaining it.
This is contingent on his own free choice.
The second sort of freedom is freedom
from guilt and misery. This man lost at
the Fall, and he has no ability in himself to
recover it. For at the Fall he became enslaved to sin and Satan, so that now he
cannot help sinning; he cannot love God,
his summum bonum, above all things, and
he cannot perform any perfealy good act.
His nature is too deeply wounded for that,
and even such naturally good aas as he
may perform must be attributed to healing
grace. What is more, without God's prevenient grace man can in no way dispose
or prepare himself for the justifying grace
which will deliver him from his sinful
plight.
In this connection St. Thomas suggests,
as Luther does, that God in His law commands impossible things - not intrinsi-
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ally impossible, but impossible to man
without grace; though he qualifies this by
saying they are not entirely (omnino) impossible. For men are capable of doing
what God commands in the sense of moral
behavior, though they cannot do it in the
way God wants it done, namely out of pure
love for God and the good. Here too there
is a resemblance to Luther, in his distinction between "doing the works of the I.aw"
and "fulfilling the Law." But we must not
make Aquinas more Lutheran than he is,
and there is one important point of difference that cannot be overlooked. It is
that Aquinas speaks of man's /res will as
enslaved to sin and Satan, while Luther
speaks only of the will, which he denies
to be free. McSorley suggests (I think
rightly) that St. Thomas could very well
have used St. .Augustine's phrase, libtmmJ
11rbilri#m up1W1111m1, or "free will in captivity"; but he would undoubtedly have repudiated Luther's Sffll#m t11bilrium.
For Aquinas, as for Erasmus, it is essential for man to have freedom of choice.
Without it he could not be held responsible for obedience or disobedience ro
God's cornrnandments; nor would God be
just in meting out rewards and punishments to him, since he could not merit
diem. With this we come to the point of
Luther's profoundest objection to the doctrine of free will, namely the idea of merit.
.As he sees it, the idea of man's merit is
utterly incompadble with the grace by
which God has freely aeated man out of
nothing and redeemed him freely and for
nothing through Christ. .AJ Aquinas sees
it, on the other hand, grace by no means
excludes merit; although he is as sure u
Luther or Augustine that grace is not grace
unless it is g,IIIU, and although in order

9

Concordia Theological Monthly, Vol. 40 [1969], Art. 72

756

ERASMUS, LUTHER, AND AQUINAS

to keep it so he quite considerably modifies
the meaning of merit.
Talce first the common scholastic distinaion between "congruous" and "condign" merit. In the Nominalist theology
known to Erasmus and Luther, congruous
merit is atuibuted to man's well-intentioned efforts when he "does what in him
lies" to reach out after saving grace. Although these efforts are not strictly meritorious, it is congruous or fitting for God
to reward them with a gift of grace. Condign merit, however, arising from works
done with the aid of that grace, is strictly
meritorious and a necessary passport to
heaven. On this view, grace and free will
are each a partial cause of salvation; for
a certain initiative is reserved to man,
which, however inconsiderable it may be as
compared with grace, nevertheless makes
salvation dependent on man's reaching out
after it. This view McSorley describes, incidentally, as "Neosemipelagiaoisrn." By
contrast with it, Aquinas holds that man
can make no effort whatsoever toward
salvation apart from grace. Even when he
"does what in him lies" it is because God
in His grace has touched and moved his
free will to do so. Moreover, congruous
and condign merit are not successive stages
so much as different aspects of the work
of grace; for one and the same aa when
considered as done by man's free will carries congruous merit, and when considered
as done by divine grace carries condign
merit. Here grace and free will aaing
conjointly are the whole cause of salvation,
but in such a way that the initiative lies
wholly with God. This involves the Augustinian paradox that man's free acceptance of saving grace depends on God's
moving him to it by prevenient grace.

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/72

To remove any possible doubt on this
subject, let us look finally at St. Thomas'
doctrine of predestination. In expounding
it in the Sttmma he begins by stating that
no reason can be given why God eleas
some men to glory and reprobates others,
except that God so wills. He maintains,
however, that in both cases God manifests
His goodness- in the form of mercy
towards the elect, and in the form of justice towards the reprobate. Divine predestination, moreover, must not be thought
to exclude human freedom; for God "preordained to give glory on account of merit"
and free will is the "meritorious cause" of
glory. At the same time, "that which flows
from free will is also of predestination,"
since God bas "pre-ordained to give grace
to merit glory." Predestination is thus the
cause of both future glory and present
grace. On the other hand, reprobation is
not the cause of sin. It is the cause of
abandonment by God and of eternal punishment; but guilt proceeds from the free
will of the person who is "reprobated and
deserted by grace." For although the reprobated cannot obtain grace, and therefore
cannot do any good and acquire merit, yet
he still has the freedom to choose between
sins, and therefore his sinning is rightly
imputed to him as guilt.
Which things being so, what advantage
has Aquinas' "free will in captivity" over
Luther's "will in bondage"? Does its merit,
acquired by grace alone, really safeguard
the justice of God in dealing with men?
Does it even preserve man's responsibility?
What, then, is there to be said for it? Not
a great deal, I think, but perhaps just a
little.
To begin with, Luther's insistence that
freedom is properly predicated only of God

10

Watson: Erasmus, Luther, and Aquinas

ERASMUS, LUTHER, AND AQUINAS

and the children of God is contrary to all
normal usage and very confusing. .And it
is quite unnecessary, for we can very well
distinguish between different sorts or levels
of freedom. Aquinas therefore - and, we
may add, Erasmus - cannot be faulted for
equating a voluntary act with a free act
and for regarding it not as a necessary but
a contingent act. Unfortunately, Luther
equates contingency with luck or chance,
for which he can .find no room in God's
world; and freedom he equates with the
liberty of indifference, which is meaningless except as it refers to the indifference
of God's love to the merits of men. Men
make voluntary choices, it is uue, but not
by happenstance; their choices are necessitated, in the sense of determined or motivated, and men do not choose their motivations.
McSorley takes suong exception to Luther's "necessitarianism" as he calls it, but
acquits him of the charge of determinism.
It is after all only in relation to "things
above him" that Luther totally denies man's
freedom. But McSorley feels that man must
be allowed some freedom here too. Granted
that man can do absolutely nothing to
obtain for himself the saving grace of God,
yet it must be possible for him to refuse
or reject it. Otherwise, how do you aplain Adam's fall without making God
responsible for it? And how can the elect
children of God be regarded as meriting
their heavenly reward? It is uue, McSorley
admits, that Aquinas so moduics the meaning of merit that he might almost as well
have dispensed with it; but he had to have
some way of affirming man's responsibility
and speaking meaningfully about reward.
On this I will only comment that it is
a pity Aquinas did not dispense with the
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idea of merit. We might then have been
spared the Neoscmipclagianism that provoked Luther's wrath, and Luther himself
might have been able to tolerate morc
ordinary notions of free will
Be that as it may, it is interesting to
notice that even in the D, sffllo 111bi1tio
Luther admits that man possesses a capacity
for response to God's grace-a "dispositional quality" or "passive aptimdc" he
calls it - which animals and inaoimare
objectS do not; and he repeatedly insists
that the response man makes is in no way
coerced but entirely voluntary. He also
knows that the divine initiative can provoke a negative as well as a positive reaction, which also is voluntary. What is
more, in the Table Talk, replying to the
question why God elects this man and not
that, he can reply:
This diHereocc is to be ascribed to man.
not to the will of God, for the promises of
Goel arc universal. He will have all men
to be saved. Accordingly it is not the fault
of our Lord God, who promises salvation,
but it is our fault if we are unwilling to
believe it.
By most ordinary standards it would not
be unnatural to speak of a real clement of
freedom here: not the absolute freedom of
God, and not the liberty of the children
of God, nor yet simply freedom with regard to the things beneath man, but perhaps (so to put it) a freedom of responsible reaction to things above him.
Not that this explains anything. It
leaves us with a paradox, which affirms
both human responsibility and the sovereignty of divine grace - the sunc paradox with which Aquinas leaves us, despite
all his ingenious attempts at ezplanatioa.
It is a paradox that docs justice to the
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.realities of Christian faith and experience,
and it ought therefore to be maintained
and preached and taught in all its paradoxicality. Erasmus with his attempts to rationalize it virtually eliminsites it. Aquinas
with his doctrine of merit and his desire
m save the justice of God endangers the
sovereignty of grace. Luther by his arguments for the sovereignty of grace undoubtedly imperils the responsibility of
man. But Luther has one great advantage

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol40/iss1/72

over the Schoolmen: that he rather rejoices in paradoxes and is not unduly
anxious to resolve them. He is at point
after point content to say, We do not know
the reason for this, but God knows, and
we can be quite sure His reasons are good.
It would be well if theologians more often
exhibited such responsible faith in the
absolute sovereignty of God and His grace.
Evanston, Ill.
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